CHAPTER 6
The use of referenda – putting the decision out to the publicSo far three councils – Milton Keynes, Croydon and Bristol – have used referenda to test public opinion about council tax levels and associated packages of service spending. This chapter looks at their experience to draw key lessons for other local authorities considering this approach.
Table 6.1 provides an indication of the timetable used by Milton Keynes. It suggests that there are four broad phases to the referendum process. Each of these phases will be examined below:
communication and awareness raising
setting the referendum options
conducting the referendum
reviewing the results
The last section in this chapter looks at the costs of going down the referendum route and comes to a judgement about the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.
Table 6.1: Milton Keynes: referendum timetable
Period/date Activities November – December 1998 Phase 1 budget consultation exercise:
- Public meetings at local venues
- Special meetings for voluntary organisations, schools and businesses
- Explanatory leaflets mailed directly to local businesses
and organisations
- Adverts and articles in local press
- Focus group
- Responses by questionnaire, letter, e-mail and telephone.
14th January 1999 Second focus group – discussed clarity and helpfulness of referendum material 21st January 1999 Special Policy & Resources Committee
- Agreed referendum question wording
- Agreed referendum supporting information
1st February 1999 Referendum papers despatched to 149,241 electors 19th February 1999 Deadline for voting (5pm) 23rd February 1999 Referendum results announced at press conference 2nd March 1999 Council meeting receives referendum results Source: Geoff Snelson. The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study
COMMUNICATION: RAISING AWARENESS
Before starting on the referendum process proper some preparation work by the council is essential. So the informal, in-house timetable for planning is probably some six months before the schedule set out in Table 6.1. The first task having decided to use a referendum, is to make clear the key issues in the budget debate. In November – December, Milton Keynes used a mix of communications methods to both raise awareness of budget issues and test public opinion. Methods used were:
A leaflet sent directly to the council’s mailing list of local businesses and organisations.
Advertisements and articles in the local press.
A series of public meetings at venues across the council area.
A series of meetings for special interest groups such as schools, voluntary organisations and business.
A focus group comprising a cross-section of local people.
The point of this preparation work is more communication than consultation since none of these mechanisms provided a representative sample and much time was spent explaining the council’s budget position. Yet the feedback obtained through these methods was helpful in developing the council’s thinking and in judging some of the responses of the public and stakeholders.
DESIGNING THE BUDGET OPTIONS: A POLITICAL JUDGEMENT
Although the title to this chapter suggests that a referendum hands over a decision about budget setting to the public, that decision is taken in the context of a political choice made by councillors. Referenda are themselves located in a highly political environment. As a report on Milton Keynes experience argues, the options presented in the referendum depended entirely on political judgement:
The definition of these choices was very much a political act and no two parties would have proposed the same pattern of service changes. Indeed, a joint approach by Labour and Liberal Democrats to the development of the referendum fell apart early in the process over a disagreement about how the choices were to be constructed. The very notion of holding a referendum was opposed by the Leader of the Conservative Group.[9]
The options presented to Bristol residents in 2000 focused on Education. One option was the standstill budget (4% increase), with no changes to services. The implications of other options (0, 2% and 6%) were presented in terms of the impact on the education service in the City. This approach was coherent, since Bristol’s education spending was further above the average for similar authorities, compared with its budget for any other service-area. However, it is worth restating that the decision on how to express the implications of the options in a referendum is a political one.
The decision about whether to go for a referendum may well be taken in the context of political conflict. Moreover, the decision over which options to put forward involves political judgement. Without political ownership and leadership this form of consultation is not possible. At a minimum, political groups controlling the council have to be ready to implement any option chosen by the public in a referendum. Beyond this, councillors and senior officers can drive the consultation by the determination and commitment they give to the process.
A considerable amount of officer time is also required to ensure that the budget options are as real as possible to individual households. The Croydon options included any increase in the Greater London Authority’s precept to ensure that the figure supported by voters would be the bottom line council tax increase, irrespective of the uncertainties posed by the GLA’ s budgetary processes. This suggests that even in two tier areas a referendum is a viable option.
In the case of Croydon three options were presented to the public. The options supported the core budget but required a decision between various packages of increases. Croydon offered in 2001:
– Option A – 2% increase. A below inflation option representing a cut in council tax in real terms but ensuring that residents would continue to receive the same level of services. Under this option, Band D would increase to £823.87, an increase of £1.35 a month.
– Option B – 3.5% increase. An increase broadly in line with inflation that would guarantee current services and allow an extra £1.4 million to be spent on a package of proposals to make the borough cleaner and safer and to ensure the library opening times were extended. Under this option, Band D would increase to £839.99, an increase of £2.68 a month. The council proposed to achieve this by spending: £1.2 million on a borough-wide kerbside recycling to be introduced over an 18 month period, together with a CCTV van. A further £100,000 would be spent on extending the free rolling rubbish collection service and £100,000 on extending library opening times, starting with the central library.
– Option C – 5% increase. An increase in line with the Government’s expectations for council tax increases; this Option would enable the council to provide the additional services proposed under Option B. A further £500,000 would also be spent on crime reduction measures, £200,000 in improving and increasing play areas in parks for young children, £100,000 on home composting containers and a further £100,000 on library opening times. Under this option, Band D would increase to £848.11, an increase of £3.37 a month.
In 2002 Croydon offered:
– Option A – 3.65% increase. Cleaner and Greener Croydon. £522K on removing graffiti from public buildings, removing abandoned vehicles, bulky household collection, street cleansing and fly tipping. Safer Croydon. £350K on a package of crime prevention measures, including a new pilot neighbourhood warden scheme. £20K to help local people feel more secure by continuing the council’s successful Alleygators scheme, which provides security gates across local alleyways. Better Leisure for Croydon. £150K more on improving leisure activities.
– Option B – 5.15% increase. Cleaner and Greener Croydon. £650K on extending the graffiti removal scheme to include private property. £250K on extending the Smarter Croydon Community Grants Scheme so that local people can apply for grants to improve their own local environment. Safer Croydon. £125K on extending the SAFE initiative, which provides free home security checks and safety and security equipment to older people in areas with high burglary rates. £150K on extending the neighbourhood warden scheme. Better Leisure for Croydon. £325K on another Mobile Library and allowing most libraries to be open longer.
– Option C – 6.65% increase. Cleaner and Greener Croydon. £950K on providing a 7-day responsive graffiti removal service for public and private properties across the borough. Safer Croydon. £300K more on crime initiatives including even more CCTV and further neighbourhood warden schemes. Better Leisure for Croydon. £125K on improving and increasing play areas in parks for young children. £125K on two new multi-ball games areas.
The options offered by Milton Keynes included a core budget plus various level of tax increase in order to pay for services (see Table 6.2). The referendum papers sent to each voter contained a leaflet where the two centre pages were devoted to a description of the three budget options.
Table 6.2: Outline description of Milton Keynes referendum options
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Core budget (including Core budget (including Core budget (including £8.7m savings package) £8.7m savings package) £8.7m savings package) Plus extra spending Plus extra reductions 15% increase in council tax 9.8% increase in council tax 5% increase in council tax Net budget = £172.884m Net budget = £171.082m Net budget = £169.454m Source: Geoff Snelson. The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study As a Milton Keynes commentary notes:
This approach contrasted with budget consultations in previous years when there was far less emphasis on the outcomes for the community. For the referendum it was felt that the impact of the options for local people must be demonstrated clearly so they could see the relevance of taking part. The success of the exercise would also depend on the local people feeling they had been able to make an informed choice about the options. Its credibility would be damaged over the longer term if the referendum option chosen led to changes in tax or services that those voting had not anticipated.
The conduct of a referendum therefore introduced a number of disciplines to the budget consultation process that would be beneficial in any event. In particular, debates about options were begun earlier and more attention was placed on the service and community implications of the budget.[10]
The key point (reflected in the material on public opinion in Table 1.2) is that the public need to know what the council tax they pay will be used for. They need to believe the money raised will be used effectively and for purposes stated by the council.
Milton Keynes used a further focus group to test the budget options and information that was eventually presented to the public in a referendum. This group suggested some changes to the information provided where they thought the material would bias the outcome and also pointed to changes in the design and the way that information was presented. A special meeting of the council’s policy committee was called in late January to agree the final wording of the referendum and the information on the various budget options.
THE REFERENDUM PROCESS
Milton Keynes, Bristol and Croydon all used the Electoral Reform Balloting Services (ERBS) to conduct the ballot, although it should be pointed out that there are other organisations who offer this service. In Milton Keynes a copy of the electoral register was provided to ERBS and all those on the register were entitled to vote including 17 year olds that would reach voting age during the financial year in question. People were allowed to vote by post or telephone. The voting period ran from 1 February to 19 February. Croydon followed a similar process but also, through ERBS, offered people the choice of voting on the internet (as was the case in Bristol). In Croydon the 2001 voting period ran from 5 February to 14 February and again in 2002 people were given roughly ten days to vote.
There was some discussion in Milton Keynes as to whether only taxpayers should be allowed to vote but the council insisted that all those on the electoral register were entitled to a say in this exercise in local democracy. This principle is the appropriate one to follow.
Voters were given an opportunity to express both a first and a second preference in Croydon referenda. The aim here was to allow a 50% support to emerge for one of the three options presented in the referenda. Milton Keynes took a rather different line as noted below leaving the vote open to interpretation by the council.
The period of the ballot is also a time when information about the options and encouragement to vote needs to be aimed at the public. Milton Keynes were able to use a variety of means to obtain coverage:
As delivery of the referendum papers began, advertisements were broadcast on a local radio station alerting people to look out for them. A second wave of radio advertisements was broadcast toward the end of the voting period reminding people of the deadline. A referendum poster was produced and distributed to council offices, libraries, parish and neighbourhood councils, community centres and community groups with the request that it be displayed in public places. Feature articles on the referendum were placed in parish, town and neighbourhood council newsletters and in the council’s own magazine – ‘Messenger’, delivered to every household in the borough. During the voting period, turnout figures were released to the media in order to gain additional publicity.[11]
Croydon employed a similar mix of methods but, in addition, used poster sites in the area and ran a hotline during the period of the vote so that people could ring up asking for advice and information. In addition to local media coverage there is also a need to plan to cope with national media interest. A leading member in Bristol told our interviewers:
There was an unprecedented amount of local and national publicity in the run-up to the referendum – almost all of it favourable. There is no other recent example of Bristol making such a positive impact.
The referendum voting period is also potentially a time for campaigning. In the case of Milton Keynes, the controlling Labour group had already indicated in the leaflet distributed with the voting slips that their preference was for the middle option of a 9.8% increase and during the period of the referendum Labour Party activists distributed thousands of leaflets in support of that option.
In Bristol, by contrast, there was little or no political campaigning, although some lobbies made their voices heard. If turnout is any indication, this did not make the referendum less salient to people. It appears that party political contribution to the debate is not a prerequisite of a successful budget referendum.
Table 6.3: Framing the Options: The Bristol Case Bristol is a good example of how the options presented to the public in a referendum need to reflect the local situation:
In 2000, before the referendum, Bristol had had one of the highest council tax levels in the country, and the majority group had frozen council tax for two consecutive years. There was clearly a strand of local opinion that it should happen again. Hence, a 0% increase was one of the options presented.
Spending on Education was the key reason for the relatively high level of council tax, hence the political decision that the referendum result would impact on the education budget. The impact of each option available to voters was represented in terms of the impact it would have on the education service.
In Bristol, the political leadership did not try to ‘sell’ one of the options. Instead, the message presented was that the decision was in the hands of residents.
REVIEWING THE RESULTS
There are several issues to consider under this heading. Firstly, the turnout was respectable in all cases. In Milton Keynes, a turnout of 44.7% was considerably higher than the 26.2% turnout achieved in the local elections of 1998. The turnout in Bristol was 40.2%. In Croydon, the turnout was around 35% for both referenda, a few points down from the turnout achieved in the 1998 local elections (37.8%). There was little or no evidence of attempts to vote twice or engage in any electoral malpractice and there was a large-scale use of the postal method of voting in Croydon, Bristol and Milton Keynes. However, a substantial minority did make use of telephone voting in Milton Keynes (22.3%). In Croydon the telephone and internet combined accounted for less than 10% of votes cast in both 2001 and 2002.
The turnouts may emphasise the need to present residents with real choice in a budget referendum. The turnout in both Milton Keynes and Bristol, where the range of options offered – and their potential impact – was very significant, achieved turnout higher than in local elections. This was not true in Croydon, where there was arguably less daylight between the different options.
The results in Croydon were straightforward on both occasions. In 2001, there was an initial outright vote first preference for the lowest option of 56.58% that carried the day. In 2002, the first preference choice was again the lowest option, with this time 73.67% support. It was clear in both 2001 and 2002 what that the overwhelming preference of the public was for the lowest option.
In Milton Keynes, as shown in Table 6.4, the middle option was the most popular option at 46.35% but it was not the outright winner. The council had already anticipated this situation and had indicated prior to the referendum that votes for the higher still tax option would be added to votes for the middle option. The votes for the two higher options added together to over 70%. The interpretation offered by Milton Keynes of its result was widely accepted.
Table 6.2: Outline description of Milton Keynes referendum options
Council Tax increase Number of votes Per cent Option 1 15% 15 730 23.6% Option 2 9.8% 30 891 46.35% Option 3 5% 20 026 30.05% Total 66 647 Source: Geoff Snelson. The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study
Croydon and Bristol analysed the results by ward and found that this additional information yielded insights into the attitudes of different neighbourhoods: perhaps unsurprisingly, the more deprived wards favoured the lower tax options more than the wealthy wards.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Various strengths and weakness of the referendum route are outlined below.
People were engaged
According to a Milton Keynes official:
The overall verdict was that the referendum was a resounding success. The council had realised its ambition of engaging the whole community in a major decision and had been given a mandate to increase council tax by the amount it felt was necessary. Awareness of the link between local taxation and services was enhanced in Milton Keynes and anecdotal evidence suggests that during the referendum people were talking about local council services with their families and neighbours. The high turnout shows that people do have an interest in the activities of their local council and that there is much scope for increasing democratic participation at the local level. The provision of clear, succinct information about issues of direct relevance to local citizens coupled with easier ways in which to vote appear to be part of the solution.[12]
This sense of positive engagement was also a feature of Croydon’s and Bristol’s experience. As the then leader of Milton Keynes commented to our researchers: “it was the talk of the clubs and pubs”
People appear to make a considered judgement
Although in the Bristol referendum 54% voted for a tax freeze and in Croydon voters opted for the lowest tax option, it is not the case that people will always vote for a low tax option or a no tax increase. This was demonstrated in Milton Keynes, where the middle option was the most favoured.
Substantial US experience at state level indicates that even in a low tax climate tax cutting referendums and initiatives do not always win. Between 1978-1999 over half of all state referendums and initiatives have been lost whether proposing tax cuts or increases. It is true that tax-cutting referendums had a greater success rate (48%) than those of tax increasing measures (37%). However, there is much evidence that voters weigh the issue seriously and are influenced by they whether they see the public bodies as wasteful or alternatively providing value for money. On the other hand the main advocates of initiative measures in the US are not slow to boast about it being a curb on big government.
Existing practice does suggest therefore that ballots to increase taxes will not automatically be lost (even in the low tax culture of the US evidence). Equally it would appear that if the public are sceptical about the general qualities of their council they are likely to use the ballot to make a point. As Milton Keynes and Croydon officials noted in their comments to our researchers, a referendum requires an element of trust between the council and the public. The public has to see the value of the case made and believe that any additional money made available though higher taxes will go to their priorities and be effectively spent.
The costs are considerable so the choices must be significant
The Croydon referendum cost between £150-200k, including spending on publicity and information provision. The Milton Keynes costs were estimated at the somewhat lower level of £70k. There was also a considerable commitment of officer time. So to justify the cost of a referendum, it is important that a council puts significant issues on the table and is clear that the public is the ultimate arbiter. The choice had to be about tax increase and services packages that the public would notice. The political controlling group had to be prepared to work with the verdict of the public.
The referendum option can potentially be undermined by the complexities of central funding for local services
The referendum option pushes the issues of how council spending is underwritten to the fore. People have to judge how fair the current level of funding from the centre is and whether the package of service benefits they are being offered in a referendum is an illusion or will be tangible and obtainable in no other way than through a council tax increase. Given the complexities of central funding in this field some may argue that it is impossible to present the public with a meaningful choice.
A referendum can achieve residents’ ‘buy in’ to a political decision
This is what happened in Milton Keynes. The council was in a unique situation following local government reorganisation, and the leadership felt that a substantial council tax increase was justified. The referendum enabled the council to explain the reasons for this – and gain a mandate from the community. In contrast, the Bristol referendum did not seek a mandate.
A referendum can be a transparent way of allowing the public to state its preference
This is what happened in Bristol. The council leadership offered a real choice to residents in the referendum, and made a conscious decision not to express a preference. In this case, leadership was required internally for a referendum to be held – but, externally, once the referendum was up and running, the majority group was not leading the debate (again, in contrast to the situation in Milton Keynes).
The result influences how successful the referendum is perceived to have been
In Bristol, the result effectively meant that 46% were for a council tax increase, and 54% for a freeze. This demonstrated polarization, with the result that the referendum did not build support for a budget consensus, which would have been the ideal outcome. In practice, the result meant that a sizeable minority, including a significant number of ‘activists’ were unhappy at the result. The view has been expressed that the referendum result was wrong, with the suggestion reported in a national newspaper that the outcome (cuts in education funding) meant that the exercise had been mishandled.
More informed residents – or more engaged?
Some of our interviewees have suggested that one outcome of a referendum is that, overall, residents are more informed – about what the council does, how it spends its budget, etc. Another outcome is seen in terms of a better relationship between the council and its citizens. By asking for residents’ opinions in such a high profile way, this promoted a more positive relationship with the public.
[9] Geoff Snelson, The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study.
[10] Geoff Snelson, The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study.
[11] Geoff Snelson, The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study.
[12] Geoff Snelson, The Milton Keynes Council Budget Referendum. A Case Study.
Published 4 July 2002
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